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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
statute.15 In lieu thereof the injured husband is required to join
the adulterer as a co-respondent in a suit for divorce, unless such
joinder is dispensed with by the court upon sufficient grounds,
and if the adultery is proved, damages therefor are recovered against
the co-respondent.'6 Some states deny the husband a right of
action against one who has merely deprived him of his wife's
affections. 7 Louisiana has refused to allow a husband any right
of action for damages either for alienation of his wife's affections
or for criminal conversation. 8 In view of these recent decisions
it seems that a court would not be doing violence to stare decisis
to discourage the action of criminal conversation or at least to
place a decided check upon large and oppressive verdicts rendered
therein. Whatever the outcome we feel that the resources of the
common law are capable of a nearer approximation to perfect
justice than was attained in the Brewer Case.
-FIXOM W. MANN.
' 20 and 21 Victoria, ch. 85, § 59.
loQuicke v. Quicke, 2 Sw. & Tr. 419.
17 Sherry v. Moore, 155 N. E. 441 (Mass. 1927).
'a Moulin v. Monteleone. 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927).
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS-EMINENT Do-
MAN.1-Restrictive covenants have been employed very extensively
in modern times for the purpose of safe-guarding property against
undesirable uses of adjacent property. They have been looked
upon with favor by the courts and there is now no question of
their enforcibility against the eovenator and purchasers of the
property with notice of the restriction.'
With the increasing use of this device a number of problems
have arisen. Among them is to what extent the owners of land
I This note was prepared as part of the work in an Honor's Course.
2 Catt v. Tourle, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 652 (1868-9); Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil.
774, 11 Beav. 571 (1848); Webb v. Robbins, 77 Ala. 176 (1879); Bryan
v. Grosse, 155 Cal. 132, 99 Pac. 499 (1909); Baker et al. v. Lunde et al.,
96 Conn. 530, 114 Atl. 673 (1921); Tinker v. Forbes, 136 II1. 221, 26 N.
E. 503 (1891); Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546 (1876); Kettle River Ry. Co.
v. Eastern Ry. Co., 41 Minn. 461, 43 N. W. 469 (1889); Talmage V. East
River Bank, 26 N. Y. 105 (1862); Korn v. Campbell, 192 N. Y. 490, 85 N.
E. 687 (1908); Boyden et al., v. Roberts et al.. 131 Wis. 659, 111 N. W. 701
(1907); Eason v. Buffaloe, 152 S. E. 496 (Ga. 1930); Dixon v. Van Swerin-
gen, 31 Oh. St. 56, 166 N. E. 887 (1929); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PaoP., 2nd ed.,
1446; 33 HAnv. L. REv. 813; 24 L. QUAR. REv. 366.
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benefited by restrictive covenants are entitled to compensation
when the servient land is condemned for purposes 'which, when
effectuated, -would amount to a violation of the covenant. In
England and in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States
where the question has been raised, the restrictive covenant has
been considered a property right and if taken must be compen-
sated for.3 The contrary view has been accepted by Ohio and
the lower federal courts.4
The basis of the decisions allowing compensation is that the
owner of each lot in a restricted district has an interest in each
other lot, and the taking of such a lot for public use is a taking
of his interest therein, for which he is entitled to compensation
under the Constitution.
The analogy to common law easements may be considered. It
is doubtless true that building restrictions did not constitute ease-
ments known to the common law. The House of Lords, however,
has stated that the category of easements must expand with the
circumstances of mankind.5 That there is much in common be-
tween these restrictive covenants and easements cannot be denied.
It has been held that where property subject to an easement is
taken by eminent domain the owner of the dominant tenement
is entitled to compensation for the destruction of his interest.0
The so-called easement of light, air and accessibility in property
abutting on a public street is not a common law easement but its
impairment by public use of a street is a taking of property.,
SLong Eaton Recreation Co. v. Midland Ry. Co., 2 K. B. 574 (1902);
Herr v. Board of Education, 82 N. J. L. 610, 83 Atl. 173 (1912) ; Rowland V.
Mercer Co. Traction Co., 90 . 3. L. 82, 102 At]. 814 (1917); Peters v.
Buckner, 288 Mo. 618, 232 S. W. 1024, 17 A. L. R. 543 (1921); Allen i'.
City of Detroit, 169 Mich. 464, 133 N. W, 317, 36 L. R. A. N. S. 890 (1911),
Ladd v. City of Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 24 N. E. 858, 21 Am. St. Rep, 481
(1890); Flynn v. New York W. & B. Ry. Co., 218 N. Y. 140, 112 N. E. 913
(1916); Fuller v. Town Board of Town of Madison, 193 Wis. 549, 214 N.
W. 324 (1927); 2 LEwis, EMINENT DomAIN, 530, n. 11; 2 TIFFANY, REAL
INor., 2nd ed., 2162.
4Doan v. Cleveland Short Line Ry. Co., 92 Oh. St. 461, 112 N. E. 505
(1915); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. -. Gale, 119 Oh. St. 110, 162 N. E. 385
(1928) (application for certiorari was denied by Supreme Court of the
United States for want of a substantial Federal question, 278 U. S. 571, 49
Sup. Ct. Rep. 93 (1928); In re Newlin, 112 Fed. 622 (1899) ; Wharton
v. U. S.; 153 Fed. 876 (1907).
GALE ON BASEMENTS, 20.
Newman v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry. Co., 118 N. Y. 618, 23 N. E. 901
(1890); U. S. v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333, 30 S. Ct. 527 (1910); Miller v.
Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 547, 26 N. E. 100 (1891); 1 LEwis, EMINENT
DOMAIN, § 223; 2 TIFFANY, REAL Pnop., 2162, n. 5.
7In re Forty-Second Street, 216 N. Y. S. 2, 126 Misc. Rep. 879 (1926);
Randon 'v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, 143 Mich. 661, 107 N. W. 439 (1906).
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Furthermore, in other types of cases where the question has
arisen as to whether a restriction is a property interest the courts
have usually indicated that it should be so regarded.8
Reasoning by analogy, however, is not very satisfactory in
solving problems of this nature. There may be considerations of
social policy that make it undesirable to give compensation in
cases of this kind. If that is true the conception of "property
interest" is sufficiently flexible to permit the inclusion or exclu-
sion of these equitable interests, depending upon the court's view
of the desirability of giving compensation. Under the modern
practice one frequently encounters reciprocal restrictive covenants
over large areas of land included in a development scheme. It is
not unusual to have a very large number of lots restricted to cer-
tain uses in order to enhance the value of these lots and to attract
purchasers. Let us suppose that these lots have been sold, and
subsequently A, by eminent domain proceedings, takes a parcel
of this land which is restricted in favor of all the other lots. A's
intended use of the land so taken will violate the covenant. If
the owners whose lands are not physically taken are allowed com-
pensation for the destruction of their interests, the condemnor
would have to pay a sum perhaps many times the value of the
land actually taken. This would place a great burden on the
condemnor, which might amount to a discouragement of the taking
of land and this might be detrimental to the public generally.
It may be noted that where land is taken for a public use in the
ordinary case there is frequently considerable depreciation in the
value of surrounding property which must be borne by the in-
dividual owners in the public interest.9 The loss, however, is dis-
tributed over a large number of owners and the burden on each
individual owner has not been so great as to call for any judicial
remedy. It may be that the increased burden on the condemnor
requiring him to give damages in so large an amount may have
influenced the Ohio Court in reaching the decision that no com-
pensation could be allowed. A suggestion of this is to be found
in the statement, "The right of eminent domain rests upon public
necessity, and a contract or covenant or plan of allotment -which
attempts to prevent the exercise of that right is clearly against
public policy, and is therefore illegal and void."'
Other courts have not felt the force of this consideration. The
S Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Mass. 380, 100 N. E. 622 (191'3); Ham v.
Massasoit Real Estate Co., 42 R. I. 293, 107 Atl. 205 (1919); Rice v.
Roberts, 24 Wis. 461 (1869); Contra, Lenning -v. Ocean City Assn., 41 N.
J. Eq. 606, 7 At. 491 (1886) ; 38 HARv. L. Rsv. 967-71; Green v. Creighton,
7 R. I. 1 (1861); 6 N. CAR. L. REv. 308.
9 Flynn v. New York W. & B. Ry. Co., supra, n. 3.
10 Doan v. Cleveland Short Line Ry. Co., supra, n. 4.
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New York court states that "these restrictive covenants **
make direct and compensational the damages which otherwise
would be consequential and non-compensational."' 1 In determin-
ing the damages to be allowed the court measures the depreciation
in value of each piece of property which allows the difference in
value between the land with and without the benefit of the restric-
tion.12 This would seem to be the logical method of determining
such damages. It has been the method followed formerly in the case
of the valuation of the common law easements.' 8 In United States
v. Welch,"4 the government permanently flooded a three acre strip
contiguous to other land of the plaintiff. The latter had a right of
way over other lands of different ownership to a county road. The
flooding of the strip destroyed access to the right of way. The
court held them entitled to compensation not only for the three
acres flooded, but also for the diminished value of their other land
caused 'by the destruction of their use of the right of way.
"A private right of way is an easement and is land.
We perceive no reason why it should not be held to be
acquired by the United States as incident to the fee for
which it admits that it must pay. But if it were only
destroyed and ended, a destruction for public purposes may
as well be a taking as would be an appropriation for the
same end. * * * * * The same reasoning that allows a
recovery for the taking of land by permanent occupation
allows it for a right of way taken in the same manner, and
the value of the easement cannot be ascertained without
reference to the dominant estate to which it was attached."
It is also worthy of note that the burden on the condemnor may
frequently be reduced by taking into account in the valuation
the benefits to their property arising from the improvement that
involves the violation of the restrictive covenant. This has been
done with respect to common law easements.", The theory seems
to be not that these benefits are deductible from the damages but
that they may be considered in ascertaining how much, if any,
the property has been actually reduced in value by the appropria-
tion of the rights of the dominant owner.
There is another entirely different method of measuring the
21 Flynn v. New York W. & B. Ry. Co., supra, n. 3.
2 zUupra.
is Supra, n. 6.
14 Supra, n. 6.
15 Newman v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry. Co., supra, n. 6; Page V. Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 70 Ill. 324 (1873).
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damages which has been adopted by the New Jersey court.16 Al-
though in theory compensation is allowed to dominant owners
where the servient land is taken by eminent domain, this rule for
the measurement of damages seems to recognize a public policy
against imposing such a heavy burden upon condemnors. In Herr
v. Board of Educationa 7 the Board sought to condemn lands subject
to restrictive covenants. An award was made to the owners of
the fee but not to the covenantee. He brought an action to recover
damages and testimony was admitted that the use of the tract
taken would affect the value of the property of the covenantee.
The court held that this not proper since the proper issue was the
value of the land as a whole without regard to the covenants. The
covenantees were merely entitled to a share of this total sum
represented by their interest. Obviously this is a very radical
departure from the method used by the New York Court. The
decrease in value of the servient land caused by the existence of
the servitude bears very little, if any, relation to the increase in
the value of the dominant land, resulting from the restriction.
It may thus be seen that the New Jersey view represents a mid-
way position between that of New York and Ohio. Although
theoretically a claim for compensation is admitted, the total amount
recoverable by all claimants, including the owner of the fee and
the liolders of the restrictions, is limited to one gross value which
is the value of the property without regard to the restrictions.
Although this view seems illogical considerable may be said in its
support. It provides for some compensation to the owners of land
benefited by restriction, but at the same time it distributes over
a large number of owners the loss which under the New York rule
would be borne by the condemnor alone.
The view taken by the New Jersey court, however, raises problems
with respect to joinder of parties in the proceedings. If the con-
demnor fails to join the holders of restrictive covenants as parties
in the condemnation proceedings the company, after having paid
the total value of the land without regard to the restriction may
be compelled to pay over again in proceedings subsequently brought
by covenantees. Furthermore, since these parties are not bound
by the adjudication of the valuation they may insist upon another
appraisement of the entire property for the purpose of determining
the value of their restrictions. 8
-RIHARD SOLOF.
16 Herr v. Board of Education, supra, n. 3.
17 Supra, n. 3.
18 State v. Easton, & Amboy Ry. Co., 36 N. J. L. 181, 185 (1873);
Bright v. Platt, 32 N. J. Eq. 362, 371 (1880).
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